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Jean Tirole, the Nobel Prize winner in Economic Sciences in 2014, who in November 2018 visited the Financial university in 
Moscow, presents one of the most striking examples of the evolution currently experienced by some modern economists. 
He started his career as an economist at the time of rapid development of theories of regulation and competition policy. 
It was also the time of intensive development of industrial organisation (industrial economy), and especially its branch 
oriented to the public policy issues — economic regulation, antitrust law, and, more generally, economic governance of law 
in defining property rights, enforcing contracts, and providing organisational infrastructure. The progress in these areas 
reflected two methodological breakthroughs: the game theory and the theory of mechanism design. The widening use 
of game theory in industrial economics led to the migration of its achievements into other branches of microeconomics, 
such as behavioural economics and corporate finance. In 1978, Jean Tirole left for the uSA to get a PhD in Economics at 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). He began his formation as an economist. The article tells about Jean 
Tirole’s way from an engineer and mathematician to the world-class economist. The author has paid special attention to 
the traditions of the French economic science, which had a considerable impact on the main areas of scientific interests 
of Jean Tirole. Tirole’s managerial skills allowed to build an entire scientific school around him both at the university of 
Toulouse and the Jean-Jaques Laffont Foundation, and in the newly formed Institute for Advanced Research.
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АННОТАЦИЯ
Жан Тироль, лауреат Нобелевской премии по экономическим наукам 2014 г., посетивший в ноябре 2018 г. Финан-
совый университет в Москве, является одним из самых ярких примеров эволюции, которую переживают некоторые 
современные экономисты. Его карьера началась в период бурного развития теорий регулирования и конкурентной 
политики. Это было также время интенсивного развития теории промышленной организации (индустриальной эко-
номики), особенно ее отрасли, ориентированной на вопросы государственной политики — экономического регули-
рования, антимонопольного законодательства и, в более общем плане, экономического управления при определе-
нии прав собственности, принудительном исполнении договоров, обеспечении организационной инфраструктуры. 
Прогресс в  этих областях отражал два методологических прорыва: теорию игр и теорию проектирования меха-
низмов. Расширение использования теории игр в экономике промышленности привело к миграции ее достижений 
в другие отрасли микроэкономики, такие как поведенческая экономика и корпоративные финансы. В 1978 г. Жан 
Тироль отправился в США, чтобы получить степень доктора экономических наук в Массачусетском технологическом 
институте (MIT), где он начал свое становление как экономист. В статье представлен путь, проделанный Жаном Ти-
ролем от инженера и математика до экономиста мирового класса. Особенное внимание автор уделил традициям 
французской экономической науки, оказавшим немалое влияние на основные сферы научных интересов Жана Ти-
роля. Менеджерские способности Тироля позволили ему создать научную школу как в Университете Тулузы и фонде 
имени Жана-Жака Лаффонта, так и в новообразованном Институте перспективных исследований.
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MathEMatICS fIRSt
“Life is good for only two things: doing 
mathematics and teaching it.”
Siméon-Denis Poisson
At the beginning of his studies in high school, eco-
nomics was not for Jean Tirole’s choice. He was inter-
ested in mathematics and social sciences, in particu-
lar, in history and psychology. After preparatory stud-
ies at the Lycée Henri Poincaré in Nancy (1971–1973), 
he then entered the l’École Polytechnique (founded 
in 1794) in 1973, famous for its high level of teach-
ing mathematics. Here, a great event has happened in 
his school years when he has attended his first course 
in economics at the age of 21. He was fascinated by 
the issues and liked how it combines rigorous analy-
sis and social sciences. He started thinking about be-
coming an economist. However, he had to study first. 
From 1976 to 1978 he studied in the l’École Nationale 
des Ponts et Chaussées (founded in 1747 by Daniel-
Charles Trudaine, now l’École des Ponts ParisTech), 
and received a “doctorat de troisieme cycle” (an in-
termediate degree between a Master degree and a 
PhD, which has disappeared since then) in decision 
mathematics from Université Paris-Dauphine (1976–
1978). Despite thinking about economics, he became 
a mathematician and engineer. But not for long.
In 1976 Jean Tirole joined the engineering Corps 
des Ponts et Chaussées. In 2009, the Corps des ponts et 
chaussées (in English “Corps of Bridges and Roads”) and 
the Corps du génie rural, des eaux et des forêts (in Eng-
lish “Corps of Rural Engineering, Waters and Forests”) 
merged into the current Corps des ponts, des eaux et des 
forêts. It is not just that Corps des Ponts et Chaussées 
(founded in 1716) was and stays until now the elite 
corps of French engineers. It is also a think-tank in 
the sphere of engineering and economics. Among the 
important former or current members of the Corps des 
ponts et chaussées are Henri Becquerel, Augustin-Louis 
Cauchy, Jules Dupuit, Augustin-Jean Fresnel, Louis 
Joseph Gay-Lussac, Charles Joseph Minard, Claude-
Louis Navier, and, of course, Jean Tirole.
tRaDItION aND CONtINUItY
L’École Polytechnique does not require advertising, 
given that among its graduates are listed mathema-
ticians: Augustin Cauchy, Henri Poincaré, Paul Lévy, 
Joseph Liouville, Benoît Mandelbrot; economist 
Maurice Félix Charles Allais (the winner of the No-
bel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1988 “for 
his pioneering contributions to the theory of mar-
kets and efficient utilization of resources”), Jacques 
Léon Rueff, Alfred Sauvy; physicists and chemists 
François Arago, Henri Becquerel, Sadi Carnot, Louis 
Joseph Gay-Lussac, Anne-Marie Lagrange; and also 
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, André Citroën, Jean-Jacques 
Servan-Schreiber, and French marshals Ferdinand 
Foch and Joseph Joffre. This tradition of excellence 
was very important in Tirole’s development into a 
scientist and a researcher.
The intellectual tradition of microeconomic in-
quiry can be traced back to the works of the members 
of the Corps des Ponts et Chaussées. However, when 
we seek in the protohistory of microeconomics, we 
should to remember that most of the French works of 
“engineer-economists” have not been translated into 
English. Moreover, those writings belong mainly to the 
engineering literature, which is not the usual place to 
look for the origins of economics.
Engineering degrees in the French tradition were 
fairly mathematics-oriented. It is not a surprise they 
were the first in the application of mathematics, in the 
analysis of economic issues. As Tirole already noted, 
indeed, applied economic theory offers some analogies 
with engineering sciences.
It was in 1999 when Robert Ekelund and Robert 
F. Hébert edited their book Secret Origins of Modern 
Microeconomics: Dupuit and the Engineers [1]. The main 
thesis of Ekelund and Hébert’s book is that “Micro-
economics as we now know, was developed first and 
foremost by engineers rather than economists, and 
that its origins were French rather than British” (p. xi). 
Further, they write “French econo-engineers, and a few 
kindred ‘foreigners’ who were drawn into their orbit, 
were not merely forerunners of neoclassical microeco-
nomics: they were its inventors” (p. 11). Indeed, it is 
only in France, where it was possible to coin the term 
“engineer-economists”. Who was “this strange beast: 
the French engineer whose skills made him attack from 
a formal and theoretical viewpoint practical problems”, 
as already wrote Nikos Theocharakis. It was Arsène 
Jules Étienne Juvenel Dupuit (1804–1866) — an Italian-
born French civil engineer self-taught in economics.
Toll questions, consumer surplus, and willingness to 
pay. In 1844 Dupuit published an article [2] concerning 
the optimum toll for a bridge (Fig. 1). Here, he intro-
duced his curve of diminishing marginal utility for the 
first time. If somebody asks where any continuity can 
be found, then I’ll point to Tirole’s Nobel Prize Lecture 
“Market Failures and Public Policy” (December 8, 2014) 
[3], where he explains royalty stacking, the analogy to 
medieval Europe, where the river transit was hampered 
by a multiplicity of tolls; for instance, there were 64 
tolls on the Rhine River in the 14th century. However, 
in the 30-s and 40-s of the 19th century, there was no 
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welfare economics with ready answers about delivering 
of public goods and common goods.
What might make sense for profit-oriented private 
projects, can evidently be unsatisfactory for public 
works, where the objective is not to benefit the builder, 
but rather to benefit the whole community. However, 
the question arises on how to measure public benefits. 
It was what Dupuit set out to resolve using cost-benefit 
analysis developed by the father of structural analysis, 
Claude Louis Marie Henri Navier (1785–1836). In his 
article [4] published in 1830 about the evaluation of 
public works (roads, bridges, etc.), appealing to the 
cost-oriented classical economics, Navier proposed 
to measure the benefit to the community in terms of 
“costs saved” by consumers. Navier proposed a decision 
rule, meaning that projects should only be undertaken 
if the total community benefit exceeds total recurring 
costs. It means that annual cost savings to users of a 
road exceeded the interest on capital plus maintenance 
costs of the road. Dupuit made two important cor-
rections and suggested calculating consumer surplus 
instead. However, there is no sophisticated mathemat-
ics in Deposit’s works, except that algebraic equations.
Notable that Antoine Augustin Cournot (1801–1877) 
was born in 1801 when Principes d’économie politique 
by Nicolas-François Canard (1750–1833) was edited — 
the book mostly influenced Cournot. In the same year 
second French great mathematician-economist An-
toine-Auguste Walras was born (1801–1866). While 
Antoine-Auguste Walras was coeval of Cournot, Vilfredo 
Federico Damaso Pareto (1848–1923) was a ten-year-
old child when Cournot published his Recherches sur les 
principes mathématiques de la théorie des richesses [5].
During his study of mathematics in Paris (Sorbonne 
University), Cournot attended seminars at the Acad-
emie des Sciences and the salon of economist Joseph 
Droz. Also, he was under the intellectual influence of 
Pierre-Simon Laplace (1749–1827) and Joseph-Louis 
Lagrange (1736–1813). At that time, Jean Nicolas Pierre 
Hachette (1769–1834), French mathematician and a 
former disciple of Marquis de Condorcet, attracted his 
attention to the principles of mathematique sociale. The 
idea of the principle is that social sciences, like natural 
ones, could be dealt with by means of mathematics. It 
was Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de Caritat, Marquis de 
Condorcet (1743–1794), the father of social mathemat-
ics, who believed that socio-economic phenomena 
and policies ought to be studied and dealt with by 
mathematical and statistical methods, the author of 
“Condorcet theorem” (if the individual probability of 
Fig. 1. Paying toll on passing a bridge. from a Painted Window in the Cathedral of tournay (fifteenth Century)
Source: uRL: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Toll_bridge (accessed on 04.02.2019).
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reaching a correct decision is less than a half, then the 
probability that a voting assembly will reach the cor-
rect decision diminishes) and the “Condorcet paradox” 
(if individual voter preferences are transitive, the col-
lective outcome can exhibit intransitive preferences).
In 1829, Cournot became a Doctor of Science (me-
chanics and astronomy) having already licentiate in 
mathematics (1823). The thesis and a few of his arti-
cles draw attention of mathematician Siméon-Denis 
Poisson (1781–1840). In 1838, at instigation of Pois-
son, Cournot was called to Paris as Inspecteur Général 
des Études. In the same year, Cournot published his 
main work in economics, Recherches sur les principes 
mathématiques de la théorie des richesses, where he 
acknowledges Nicolas-François Canard his only pre-
decessor. Unfortunately, his work hardly received any 
response because of the French Liberal School, who 
dominated the profession of the economists in France 
at the time with the infallibility of a self-regulating 
system of markets and a radical laissez-faire line. This 
is why Karl Marx would later deride them as the “vul-
gar” economists. Cournot was left crushed and bitter. 
In 1863, Cournot rewrote his Recherches in a more 
popular way, without the mathematics, but again, it 
was completely neglected.
Nevertheless, Cournot was the first author who 
presented his analysis with graphical representation 
(Fig. 2). Indeed, a diagram is worth a thousand words. 
At this time, the use of graphical methods was no better 
illustrated than in the works of Charles Joseph Minard 
(1781–1870) [6].
Achylle-Nicolas Isnard (1749–1803) was one of the 
first of a long string of French “engineer-economists”. 
Isnard was critical of the Physiocratic doctrine. In 1781, 
he anonymously published Traité des richesses (in two 
volumes) [7], where he tried to show arithmetically 
that industry, and not only agriculture, could produce 
a ‘produit net’. Secondly, he showed that the surplus 
accrues not to landlords as such, but to all owners of 
scarce factors of production. Isnard also addressed 
the determination of prices in exchange, setting the 
problem out with the help of mathematic equations in a 
multi-good scenario as a system of equations, counting 
equations and unknowns, determining the numeraire, 
etc. It was a new way of thinking about the methodol-
ogy of economic analysis. Isnard’s writings were highly 
influential upon Léon Walras (Fig. 3).
In short, published in September 1883 in Jour-
nal des Savants the article Théorie Des Richesses 
by French mathematician Joseph Louis François 
Fig. 2. Cournot graphical representation
Source: Cournot Augustin. Recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie des richesses. Paris; 1838.
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Bertrand (1822–1900), reviewed the work of Augus-
tin Cournot (Recherches sur les principes mathé-
matiques de la théorie des richesses, par Augustin 
Cournot, Paris, 1838) and of Léon Walras (Théo-
rie mathématique de la richesse sociale, par Léon 
Walras, Lausanne, 1883). He paid special atten-
tion to Cournot’s oligopoly theory, specifically the 
Cournot’s competition model. Bertrand argued that 
the Cournot conclusion was flawed and mislead-
ing. Thus, he used prices rather than quantities 
as the strategic variables, showing that the equi-
librium price was simply the competitive price. In 
1889 Bertrand’s idea was further developed into a 
mathematical model by Francis Ysidro Edgeworth.
The marginalist revolution was not only the work of 
Swiss-French-Italian economist and mathematicians. 
Significant contributions were also made by Hermann 
Heinrich Gossen (1810–1858), William Stanley Jevons 
(1835–1882), Carl Menger (1840–1921), Marshall Alfred 
(1842–1924), John Bates Clark (1847–1938), Friedrich 
Freiherr von Wieser (1851–1926).
fRENCh tRaCK
Glorious tradition of Dupuit, Minard, Isnard Cournot, 
and Walras continued in XX century François Divisia 
(1889–1964), René François Joseph Roy (1894–1977), 
Marcel Boiteux (born 1922). François Divisia was a 
French economist most noted for the Divisia index 
and the Divisia monetary aggregates index [8–10]. 
René Roy was seriously wounded on 14 April 1917, 
as a result of which he was struck blind at the early 
age of 23. Despite that he obtained two careers, as 
an engineer and a economist, lasting for 60 years. He 
is recognised for a major result in microeconomics 
now known as Roy’s identity [11]. It is a framework 
for analysing comparative advantage. Marcel Boiteux 
is most famous for his 1949 development of “peak-
load pricing” and his 1956 theory of second-best pric-
ing in public monopoly (known as “Ramsey-Boiteux” 
prices) [12].
Maurice Félix Charles Allais (1911–2010) was a 
French physicist and economist, most known for his 
contribution, along with John Hicks and Paul Samu-
Fig. 3. Copy of léon Walras théorie mathématique de la richesse sociale, 1883
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File: Walras_-_Th%C 3%A9orie_math%C 3%A9matique_de_la_richesse_sociale,_1883_-_5834436.
tif (accessed on 04.02.2019).
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elson, to neoclassical synthesis. Even though being 
titled as a doctor-engineer from the University of Paris 
(Faculty of Science) in 1949, after his visit to the United 
States in 1933 during the Great Depression, he already 
decided to devote himself to the economy. He is 1988 
winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sci-
ences “for his pioneering contributions to the theory 
of markets and efficient utilisation of resources”. Al-
lais died at his home at the age of 99. He was French 
par excellence — reluctant to write in or translate his 
work into English. That is why many of his major con-
tributions became known to the dominant community 
only when they were independently rediscovered or 
popularised by English-speaking economists.
Gérard Debreu (1921–2004) passed the agrégation 
de mathématiques exams at the end of 1945 and the 
beginning of 1946. Being under the strong influence of 
the lecture of Henri Paul Cartan’s lecture (1904–2008) 
(French mathematician who made has made a signifi-
cant contribution to algebraic topology) he also became 
interested in economics, particularly in the general 
equilibrium theory of Léon Walras. Also, the works of 
French economist Maurice Allais had a strong influ-
ence on him. Working from 1946 to 1948 in the Centre 
National de la Recherche Scientifique he moved from 
mathematics to economics. In 1948, Debreu visited 
the United States where he visited several American 
universities. In 1950, he began working in the USA 
and became the US citizen in 1975. In 1983, he was 
awarded a Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences.
The marginalist revolution turned political economy 
from the ‘science of what is’ to the science of ‘what 
might be if…’ As Robert Solow already said “Today 
if you ask a mainstream economist a question about 
almost any aspect of economic life, the response will 
be: suppose we model that situation and see what 
happens. Modern mainstream economics consists of 
little else but examples of this process.” Unfortunately, 
we can observe the double change of paradigm — the 
transformation of political economy into economics, 
i. e. a branch of mathematics and, second, from the 
object (reality) to subject (subjective perception of 
reality), i. e. human behaviour or psychologisation of 
economic science. The emergence of the concept of 
marginal was related with the attempts of economists 
to explain the determination of price. However, this 
resulted in the domination of the subjective theory of 
value. Classical political economy disappeared forever.
WhY ECONOMICS?
Perhaps the most significant impact on the fate of 
Tirole had a meeting with Roger Guesnerie who he 
met while giving classes at the l’École Polytechnique, 
at l’École des Ponts and who also was my adviser in 
Paris. He has specialised in the fields of general equi-
librium with non-convexities, disequilibrium macro-
economics and public economics; his doctoral advisor 
was Jean-Jacques Laffont and the most known doc-
toral student was Thomas Piketty. His professional 
activity was also influenced by the friendship with 
Roland Bénabou and Bernard Caillaud (obtained a 
PhD at the MIT (1988) for thesis Three Essays in Con-
tract Theory: On the Role of Outside Parties in Contrac-
tual Relationships”; his doctoral advisers were J. Ti-
role and O. Hart).
Roland Bénabou obtained his PhD in economics 
at the MIT in 1986, and Olivier Blanchard and Jean 
Tirole were his doctoral advisors. Bénabou published 
numerous papers jointly with Tirole. His knowledge in 
economics and psychology (“behavioural economics”), 
particularly in issues such as extrinsic incentives versus 
intrinsic motivation, determinants of prosocial behavior 
and motivated beliefs, both individual (overconfidence, 
wishful thinking, identity) and collective (groupthink, 
market manias, ideology, religion) was very helpful for 
Tirole’s researches.
In 1978 Jean Tirole started his PhD studies in Eco-
nomics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT), which he graduated from in 1981. At that time 
he was indeed a pioneer in the field of economics. Dur-
ing the second year, he studied four aspects —  theory, 
public finance, econometrics, and international eco-
nomics. He then started a thesis under the supervision 
of Eric Maskin, a 29-year-old MIT professor (2007 Nobel 
Prize winner).
Due to his classmate Drew Fudenberg, Tirole dis-
covered industrial organization and regulation, the 
fields he was not aware of prior to his PhD studies, 
widely popularised by Paul Joskow (he worked at a 
faculty of the MIT from 1972, and from 1994 to 1998 
he was the Head of the MIT Department of Econom-
ics) and Richard Lee “Dick” Schmalensee. It was also 
the time of rapidly evolving fields of game theory and 
contract theory due to the works of John Forbes Nash, 
John Harsanyi, and Reinhard Selten (all 1994 Nobel 
Prize winners for game theory, with a focus on non-
cooperative solution concepts).
The friendship and scientific collaboration with 
Drew Fudenberg resulted in two books — Dynamic 
Models of Oligopoly, (by the way, it was his first book at 
all) and PhD-level textbook for doctoral students called 
Game Theory [see Appendix]. His first book presents a 
picture of economy as an ever-evolving and non-static 
system and stands as a document to the more detailed 
and realistic approach to economic modelling which 
Tirole did so much to foster.
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In 1988 Jean Tirole presented his second book The 
Theory of Industrial Organization, the text-book for the 
advanced-undergraduates and graduates, supplement-
ed with exercises indicating the level of difficulty. Here 
we find a novel treatment for the Bertrand-Cournot 
interdependent pricing problem. He concludes his book 
with “a game theory user’s manual”, the harbinger of 
his second book Game Theory published in 1991.
In June 1981, J. Tirole submitted his doctoral thesis 
Essays in Economic Theory to the Department of Eco-
nomics (“in partial fulfilment of the requirements for 
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy”). In essay I “On the 
Efficiency of Fixed Price Equilibria” (with Eric Maskin) 
studied the properties of fixed-price equilibrium and 
related concepts were studied. In Essay II “Capital as 
a Commitment: Strategic Investment in Continuous 
Time” (with Drew Fudenberg) Tirole analysed how an 
early entrant in a market can exploit its head-start by 
strategic investment. The analysis was based on 2001 
Nobel Prize winner A. Michael Spence’s (1979) paper 
“Investment Strategy and Growth in a New Market” 
(published in Bell Journal of Economics. 1979; 10(1):1–
19). Essay III “On the Possibility of Speculation Under 
Rational Expectations” considered the possibility of 
static and dynamic speculation when traders have 
rational expectations.
In 1981 (after the PhD studies), he came back to 
France to work as a researcher at the l’École Nation-
ale des Ponts et Chaussées (ENPC). At that time, an 
economics research centre (CERAS) was established 
where he met Roger Guesnerie and Bernard Caillaud 
again. In 1980 in Rio he met Jean-Jacques Marcel Laf-
font (1947–2004) at the Econometric Society confer-
ence. Jean-Jacgues Marcel Laffont obtained his PhD 
(1975) at the Harvard University (his doctoral advisors 
were 1972 Nobel Prize winner Kenneth Arrow and 
Jerry R. Green). By the way, Eric Maskin who also was 
a student of Kenneth Arrow had already done very 
innovative work with Laffont. At that time, after Laf-
font declined calls of major American universities, he 
actively started establishing a school of economics 
in Toulouse. Not only he contributed to fundamental 
papers on information theory and public choice theory, 
but also he was the first-class organiser and manager. 
Unfortunately, Jean-Jacques Laffont was diagnosed 
with cancer in autumn 2002 and died of the disease 
on May 1, 2004.
It was a glorious time filled with discussions about 
a structural reform in such sectors as telecom, electric-
ity, postal services and railway. J.-J. Laffont and Tirole 
understood that the new theories about information 
and industrial economics could add an important per-
spective on this type of reforms and their limits. First 
of all, their book A Theory of Incentives in Procurement 
and Regulation where they elaborated a unified frame-
work which deeply influenced how economists think 
about regulations. Next collective book Competition in 
Telecommunications analysed the regulatory reform and 
the competition in network industries using the state-
of-the-art theoretical tools of industrial organisation, 
political economy, and the economics of incentives. In 
1992 Tirole decided to stay in Toulouse.
Indeed, in 1982 after George Stigler was awarded 
the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences “for his 
seminal studies of industrial structures, functioning of 
markets and causes and effects of public regulation”, 
industrial economics underwent rapid development, 
if not to say — a revolution. It greatly enhanced the 
understanding of imperfectly competitive markets and 
formed a foundation for a better-informed competition 
policy. Two methodological achievements — the game 
theory and the theory of mechanism design, in which 
J. Tirole was already an expert, stimulated the devel-
opment of the theory of optimal regulation of firms with 
market power. It was also presented by Robert Aumann 
and Thomas Schelling who were awarded with a Nobel 
Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in the field of 
game theory in 2005 for their analysis of conflict and 
cooperation and 2007 Nobel Memorial Prize winners in 
Economic Sciences Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin, and 
Roger Myerson for mechanism design theory.
In 1981, Jean-Jacques Laffont created the Groupe 
de Recherche en Économie Mathématique et Quantita-
tive (GREMAQ), a research laboratory in mathematical 
economics. However, the main idea of Jean-Jacques 
Laffont was to make the Université de Toulouse 1 Capi-
tole (University of Toulouse 1 Capitole) one of the best 
European universities in the field of economic sciences. 
First of all, in 1990 Laffont founded the partnership-
based research centre IDEI (Institut d’Économie Indus-
trielle, in English Institute for Industrial Economics) 
located in the University of Toulouse 1 Capitole. Laffont 
and his friends aimed to gather in a group of leading 
researchers of Toulouse and wanted to use the IDEI to 
provide a few more resources for developing a top-level 
European department. Jean-Jacques Laffont was the 
director of the IDEI until 2002, and J. Tirole has been 
the IDEI’s scientific director since it was established. It 
is impossible to overestimate the role of Jean-Jacques 
Laffont in the development of the economics depart-
ment in Toulouse without a strong economic tradition 
before him.
Nothing could memorialize Jean-Jacques Laffont 
better than the creation of a private foundation in 
2007 — the Fondation of Jean-Jacques Laffont-Toulouse 
sciences économiques (Foundation Jean-Jacques Laf-
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font/Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)). He was the 
director of the Foundation until 2009 and after that 
he was chairing its board and the Toulouse School of 
Economics (from 2007 as an independent institution 
and from 2011 within the University of Toulouse).
ECONOMICS —  a bRaNCh Of MathEMat-
ICS OR a SCIENCE Of a hUMaN bEING?
Were they right? Milton Friedman already said: 
“…economics has become increasingly an arcane 
branch of mathematics rather than dealing with real 
economic problems.” [13] Also strongly expressed by 
Ronald Coase: “Existing economics is a theoretical 
[meaning mathematical] system which floats in the 
air and which bears little relation to what happens in 
the real world.” [14]
Luis Garicano reminded of the words of Queen 
Elizabeth II, after she inaugurated a new building at 
the London School of Economics in November 2008, 
“She was asking me if these things are so large, how 
come everyone missed it?”, “Why did nobody notice?”, 
“No one saw this coming”. Maybe, Mark Blaug was right 
when he said “Modern economics is sick. Economics 
has increasingly become an intellectual game played for 
its own sake and not for its practical consequences for 
understanding the economic world. Economists have 
converted the subject into a sort of social mathematics 
in which analytical rigour is everything, and practical 
relevance is nothing” [15].
hUMaNIStIC MESSaGE
Division of labour in the scientific community fre-
quently encourages theorists to specialise in un-
derstanding the inner logic of new models. However, 
they usually leave the job of confronting the models 
with reality to more applied scientists. As a result, 
theoretical work sometimes seems detached from 
“the real world” and “relevant practice”.
At the beginning of this article, I wrote that Jean 
Tirole’s choice of study was not economics. Through 
his entire scientific life, he has been interested in 
other social sciences. He understands well that the 
major questions about human nature and society 
concern our understanding of behaviours and cul-
tures. In the field of political sciences, he studied 
independent agencies, party organisation and elec-
toral strategies. In the field of sociology, he is most 
interested in leadership and influence, cliques and 
collusion, stereotypes and collective reputations, real 
and formal authority, modes of communication. In 
the field of psychology, his researches concern the 
psychological aspects of incentives, motivated beliefs 
and identity. The most fruitful was a longstanding 
research jointly with Roland Bénabou related to the 
psychological aspects [16–24].
In 2011, Jean Tirole was an inspirer, and a ‘midwife’ 
of the Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST) 
in terms of the program thet the French government 
called “Investissements d’Avenir” (Investments for 
the Future). As a result, they tended to select the most 
promising research clusters and units, the laboratories 
of excellence (LaBEx = laboratoires d’excellence). Today, 
the LaBEx IAST, the highly original scientific project 
successfully united political scientists, psychologists, 
sociologists, lawyers, anthropologists, biologists, econ-
omists and historians in a fruitful cross-disciplinary 
exchange. The IAST’s scientific program involves ten 
disciplines: anthropology, biology, economics, history, 
law, mathematics, philosophy, political science, psy-
chology and sociology. It is a unified scientific project 
aiming to study the behaviour of human beings as 
evolved biological organisms who live in groups, form 
networks and coalitions, governed by formal institu-
tions and informal norms, thet produce and exchange 
scarce resources and are inspired by ideals and beliefs.
There are many fundamental questions requiring 
an immediate answer. For example, what motivates 
human behaviour? What makes humans unique? How 
has evolution shaped human biology and behaviour, 
and how do human biology and behaviour respond to 
cultural norms, family systems, political, economic 
forces and developmental experiences? What shapes 
preferences at individual, family, and societal levels, 
and what are the outcomes of those preferences? How 
do social groups and institutions emerge, function, 
and break down?
Maybe, with these and a thousand of other ques-
tions in mind Tirole decided to write his new book 
Économie du bien commun. Already in the Introduc-
tion Tirole raises questions: “Have we lost sight of the 
common good? If so, how might economics help us 
get back on track in pursuing it?” There are not only 
issues of distribution of public goods (decline of public 
services) and common goods (mainly, environmental 
unsustainability).
He takes the following principle as a point of de-
parture: no matter what their place in the society is, 
people react to the incentives when facing them. One 
can think it is about homo economicus. It is not so. In 
chapter 5 Tirole strongly dissociates it from this con-
cept. Here he discusses other dimensions of human 
beings — homo psychologicus, Homo socialis, Homo 
incitatus, Homo juridicus, Homo Darwinus. However, we 
should remember that the fiction of homo economicus 
is the hypothesis that human beings in their decisions 
are rational. It has a straightforward connection with 
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the subjective theory of value —  the substratum of 
modern economics.
Indeed, researchers in economics have increasingly 
incorporated contributions from other social and hu-
man sciences to improve our understanding of the 
behaviour of human beings (individuals and groups). 
It was not surprising for a professional economist that 
2002 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences was 
awarded to Daniel Kahneman, an Israeli-American 
psychologist and economist, mainly well-known for 
his work on the psychology of judgment and decision-
making, and behavioural economics. His empirical 
findings call into question the assumption of human 
rationality prevailing in modern economic theory. Per-
haps, the economics with its manic desire to model 
everything mathematically is now the past, and we 
will witness the resurgence of the political economy. 
Moreover, we are now witnessing the development of 
new branches of economic sciences — Neuroeconomics 
(JEL D 87) [25, 26].
The concept “tragedy of the commons” became 
widely known after an article was written by the Ameri-
can ecologist and philosopher Garrett Hardin in 1968 
[27, 28]. The term (concept and phrase) originated in 
an essay written in 1833 by the British economist Wil-
liam Forster Lloyd who analysed unregulated grazing 
on common land (also known as a “common”) in Great 
Britain and Ireland. Today, the term is used in social 
science and political economy to define a problem 
when all individuals have equal and open access to a 
shared-resource system or more widely as the “open ac-
cess problem”. It is a controversy between self-interest 
behaviour and the common good of all users.
Elinor Claire “Lin” Ostrom (1933–2012) was an 
American political economist whose work is associated 
with the New Institutional Economics (Ronald Coase, 
Douglass North, Oliver Williamson, Daron Acemoglu 
and others) and the resurgence of political economy. 
She was blamed for having poor math skills. Elinor 
Ostrom was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in 
Economic Sciences in 2009 (“for her analysis of economic 
governance, especially the commons”) for demonstrating 
exactly this concept in her book Governing the Commons 
[29]. Until today she remains the first and the only 
woman to win the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic 
Sciences. She “… has challenged the conventional wis-
dom that common property is poorly managed and 
should be either regulated by central authorities or 
privatised” [30].
In their article, Frank van Laerhoven and Elinor 
Ostrom stated: “Prior to the publication of Hardin’s 
article on the tragedy of the commons (1968), titles 
containing the words ‘the commons’, ‘common pool 
resources’, or ‘common property’ were very rare in the 
academic literature” [31]. Jean Tirole also looks for the 
answers to these questions. In his articles, written in 
collaboration with Julien Beccherle, Josh Lerner and 
others, they discussed the conditions of efficient insti-
tutions against climate change because climate change 
is expected to dramatically deteriorate the well-being 
of future generations [32–39].
fINaNCE MattERS
In one of his first articles (see also [40, 41]) devoted to 
financial issues [42], Jean Tirole considered the interac-
tion between productive and non-productive savings in 
a growing economy using an overlapping generations 
model (OLG) with capital accumulation and various 
types of rents. This provided the necessary conditions 
for an aggregate bubble. He also described the defini-
tion, nature, and consequences of asset bubbles where 
he stressed the specificity of money as an asset. De-
spite the fact thet one of fundamental contributions of 
OLG models is that they justify the existence of money 
as a medium of exchange, Tirole concluded that the in-
vestigation of overlapping generations models should 
somewhat shift emphasis from the study of money 
to that of assets held for more speculative purposes. 
He also solved the task of whether we should expect 
to observe asset bubbles in overlapping generations 
economies. This is because in two kinds of models the 
overlapping generations and infinitely lived consum-
ers (or overlapping generations with bequests) bubbles 
may exist in the former but not in the latter. He be-
lieved that bubbles are consistent with optimising be-
haviour and general equilibrium. Therefore, good un-
derstanding of their definition and properties may be 
required in various fields such as empirical studies of 
asset pricing, monetary theory, and welfare economics.
It was time when Tirole began close cooperation 
with Finnish researcher Bengt Holmström (the No-
bel Memorial Prize winner in Economic Sciences in 
2016) and Belgian researcher Mathias Dewatripont. 
Holmström specializes in the theory of contracting 
and incentives, especially applied to the theory of the 
firm, to corporate governance and liquidity problems 
in financial crises. Dewatripont, whose doctoral advi-
sor was Eric Maskin, is a researcher in the theory of 
incentives and organisations, monetary theory, and 
banking. At the same time, the development of Tirole’s 
scientific interests were significantly impacted by the 
cooperation with Jean-Charles Rochet, an expert in the 
area of systemic risk and macro-prudential regulation 
of banks, sustainable finance, industrial organisation 
of the banking sector and dynamic contract theory 
and applications.
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tWO CROSSING lINES
Despite the fact thet Tirole began his carrier as an 
economist, with issues concerning the regulation of 
market competition and the theory of industrial or-
ganisation he intensively studied financial issues. In 
his first book [43], written jointly with Drew Fuden-
berg, they surveyed works on dynamic oligopoly with 
the main focus on the formalisation of strategic rela-
tionships. They searched for the answer to the ques-
tion of how firm endogenises the firm’s rivals’ reac-
tions. This endogenisation is precisely the object of 
the game-theoretic models and the game-theoretic 
explanation of “tacit collusion”.
In 1988, Tirole published his first textbook [44]. The 
material of the book summarised lectures he had given 
in various forms at the undergraduate level at l’École 
Nationale de la Statistique et de l’Administration 
Economique (today L’ENSAE ParisTech), at the Uni-
versity of Lausanne, and as part of a basic graduate 
sequence in industrial organization at the MIT and at 
l’École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, and at 
the advanced-topics level at the MIT. Also, Tirole used 
the developments from his book published in 1985 [45] 
and translated into English by John and Hélène Bonin.
Market economy is a money economy. The theories 
of regulation and competition policy, including the 
theory of optimal regulation of firms with market power, 
must take into account how imperfectly competitive 
markets act to work out a better-informed competi-
tion policy. It also needs a well-grounded theory of 
incentives and the contract (principal-agent) theory 
connecting them with the game theory and psychology 
(strategic behaviour, preferences, information asym-
metries, tacit collusion, “moral hazard in teams” prob-
lem etc.). Intensive studies and an exhaustive review 
of existing literature created the favourable ground 
for the development of a new standard of rigour in the 
fields of industrial organisation and regulation [46–56].
Dealing with the issues of industrial policy and com-
petition, Tirole does not neglect the financial aspects. 
After his third book was published [57], he continued 
his studies in the field of finance. His cooperation with 
Jean-Charles Rochet was very fruitful, especially con-
cerning payments systems [58–67]. The second area 
of his research in finance was the regulation of the 
banking system [68]. Practical application of Jean Ti-
role’s scientific research is reflected in his next book 
[69]. Working in this direction, Tirole summarises the 
results of his research in the book [70] and the well-
known textbook The Theory of Corporate Finance [71].
In his book [70] published in 2001 Tirole wrote that 
the hope was that business cycles would be dampened, 
improved liquidity management would boost investment 
and promote growth, and would permit the transfer of 
savings from low-return to high- return countries as 
well. Such transfer should raise worldwide growth and 
should further give a chance to the labour force of low-
income countries to live better. However, capital account 
liberalisation that is capital mobility was followed by 
spectacular foreign exchange and banking crises. Tirole 
wrote: “This book is to some extent an attempt to go 
back to first principles and to identify a specific form 
of market failure, that will guide our thinking about 
crisis prevention and institutional design”. He is not the 
only one who thinks about crisis prevention is possible.
As I have already said above, the financial crisis 
in 2007–2008 shocked the majority of economists. In 
January 2018, in volume 34 of the Oxford Review of Eco-
nomic Policy titled “Rebuilding macroeconomic theory”, 
the mainstream economics was trying to rethink its 
effectiveness as an objective scientific analysis of the 
motion laws of capitalist economies [72–85]. However, 
we would not know what the right policies are if we 
did not know what caused the crisis in the first place.
Soon after the publication of his next “financial” 
books [86, 87], Tirole began collaboration with young 
French economist Emmanuel Farhi (born 1978) from 
Harvard University. After the crisis, the main focus of 
the research was concentrated on how liquidity should 
be regulated, illiquidity, shadow banking, financial 
bubbles, the optimal prudential control of a financial 
institution’s liquidity management, sovereign debts, 
and bailouts [88–94]. Dewatripont and Tirole wrote: 
“When liquidity requirements for banks were introduced 
in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, policymakers 
received little academic guidance on specific questions 
such as the measure of the liquidity buffer, its possible 
decomposition into multiple tiers, and the treatment 
of interbank exposures, of the securitization of legacy 
assets, and systemic stress.” [95]
INStEaD Of thE CONClUSION
Indeed, the scientific work and the volume of Jean 
Tirole’s work are amazing. However, it seems to me 
that the mainstream economics will continue us-
ing marginalism and the general equilibrium theory, 
trying to incorporate ‘animal spirits’ or ‘irrational-
ity’ into the models of modern economies. We will 
be witnessing no change for mainstream economics 
with its general equilibrium replacing real competi-
tion; marginal utility replacing the labour theory of 
value and the Say’s law replacing crises. If economics 
is “a window to our world,” then, given the domina-
tion of mathematics and its initial prerequisites, this 
window for many people will remain tightly closed. 
And not for the common good.
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